Extension ID oodhljjldjdhcdopjpmfgbaoibpancfk
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Reading the Chrome Web Store listing.
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Low risk Access: Scoped Trust: Some track record
Version 4.4.0 View in Chrome Web Store
Last scanned: about 16 hours ago | force re-scan
From the Chrome Web Store listing
Developer contact
Two ratings make up the result. Access is what the extension could do if it turned bad; fixed rules read it from the manifest. Trust is what the store listing shows about who publishes it and how it is received; the AI check can lower it, never raise it. Together they give the overall level.
Limited access, some track record
Little to worry about from what the manifest and the listing show.
It could reach particular data or sites, not everything.
Based on the manifest, by fixed rules: 3 findings.
Enough users and ratings, or a store badge, to show it is in real use.
Based on the store listing and the AI check.
An AI model compares what the extension asks for with what its listing says it does. It can lower trust, never raise it, and it never changes access.
Shows location flags and device info next to X usernames. Access is limited to x.com/twitter.com plus the developer's own cache worker, which matches the stated purpose. Nothing in the manifest or listing looks like a warning sign.
AI analysis by claude-opus-5-5 on 2026-11-21 18:19 UTC
Nothing found in this area.
26 URLs across 9 domains appear in the extension's files. See them on the Network tab
3 named sites
Worked out from host permissions, content script matches.
Requested at install. Ratings are CRXaminer's rule-based ones.
| Permission | What it allows | Access tier | Docs |
|---|---|---|---|
| storage Save data in the extension's own storage Chrome docs for storage (opens in a new tab) | Save data in the extension's own storage | Routine | Chrome documentation for storage (opens in a new tab) |
The manifest does not set one, so Chrome's default policy applies.
26 URLs across 9 domains appear in the extension's files. A URL in the code is not proof that the extension contacts it.
Grouped by registrable domain. Categories come from a short built-in list of well-known domains; everything else is Other and has no chip. Flags are plain facts about the URLs. URLs are shown as text and are never links.
The extension's settings file, laid out from the stored copy. Key order may differ from the original. A note under a line explains each finding that line raised. Low-risk notes are kept to one line; open one to see why.
8 lines have notes: 7 Scoped, 1 Routine.
{ "name": "X-Posed: Account Location & Device Info", "icons": { "16": "icons/icon16.png", "32": "icons/icon32.png", "48": "icons/icon48.png", "64": "icons/icon64.png", "128": "icons/icon128.png" }, "action": { "default_icon": { "16": "icons/icon16.png", "32": "icons/icon32.png", "48": "icons/icon48.png", "64": "icons/icon64.png", "128": "icons/icon128.png" }, "default_popup": "popup/popup.html", "default_title": "X-Posed" }, "version": "4.4.0", "commands": { "toggle-blocking-mode": { "description": "Switch matching posts between Hide and Highlight" } }, "background": { "service_worker": "background.js" }, "options_ui": { "page": "options/options.html", "open_in_tab": true }, "update_url": "https://clients2.google.com/service/update2/crx", "description": "See where X users are located and what devices they use. Country flags & device icons next to every username. Optional geo-blocking.", "permissions": [ "storage"It asks for the storage permission, which lets it save data in the extension's own storage. This is a routine permission with little risk on its own.
], "content_scripts": [ { "js": [ "content.js" ], "css": [ "styles/graphite-theme.css", "styles/badges.css", "styles/content.css", "styles/graphite.css", "styles/profiles.css", "styles/notifications.css" ], "run_at": "document_start", "matches": [ "*://*.x.com/*",Scoped Access to Sensitive Sites
It asks for access to sites where people bank, pay, shop or sign in: x.com (Email and social), twitter.com (Email and social). On these sites it could read what you see and act as you.
"*://*.twitter.com/*"It asks for access to sites where people bank, pay, shop or sign in: x.com (Email and social), twitter.com (Email and social). On these sites it could read what you see and act as you.
] }, { "js": [ "page-script.js" ], "world": "MAIN",Scoped Scripts Run Inside Sites' Own Code
On x.com, twitter.com, some of its scripts run inside the page's own JavaScript, not the separate space Chrome normally gives extensions. There they can change how the page's own code behaves, for example read or alter what the page sends and receives, and the page's code can reach them too.
"run_at": "document_start", "matches": [ "*://*.x.com/*",It asks for access to sites where people bank, pay, shop or sign in: x.com (Email and social), twitter.com (Email and social). On these sites it could read what you see and act as you.
"*://*.twitter.com/*"It asks for access to sites where people bank, pay, shop or sign in: x.com (Email and social), twitter.com (Email and social). On these sites it could read what you see and act as you.
], "all_frames": false } ], "host_permissions": [ "*://*.x.com/*",It asks for access to sites where people bank, pay, shop or sign in: x.com (Email and social), twitter.com (Email and social). On these sites it could read what you see and act as you.
"*://*.twitter.com/*",It asks for access to sites where people bank, pay, shop or sign in: x.com (Email and social), twitter.com (Email and social). On these sites it could read what you see and act as you.
"https://x-posed-cache.xaitax.workers.dev/*" ], "manifest_version": 3, "minimum_chrome_version": "111", "web_accessible_resources": [ { "matches": [ "*://*.x.com/*", "*://*.twitter.com/*" ], "resources": [ "page-script.js", "icons/logo.svg", "styles/graphite-theme.css", "styles/badges.css", "styles/content.css", "styles/graphite.css", "styles/profiles.css", "styles/notifications.css" ] } ]}ⓘ CRXaminer has partnered with our friends at Secure Annex to provide additional findings unique to their platform.
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